University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2005

The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech
Dale Carpenter

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Carpenter, Dale, "The Value of Institutions and the Values of Free Speech" (2005). Minnesota Law Review.
687.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/687

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Response

The Value of Institutions and the Values
of Free Speech
Dale Carpentert
Should the First Amendment pay attention to the setting
in which speech occurs, giving more protection to some institutions than to others? The very suggestion is a heresy. The First
Amendment, to a degree unknown elsewhere in American law,
has been characterized by a certain kind of blindness. It has
largely been blind to the popularity of the speech involved,
blind to whether the speech is favored or disfavored by the government, and blind to the identity of the speaker. On the other
hand, some institutions-the professional media, libraries, and
universities, for example-are especially good at serving as a
check against government abuse, informing us about important
public issues and helping us acquire knowledge. Some institutions are better First Amendment citizens than others. If we
want a robust First Amendment, why should we be blind to
that?
Much scholarship identifies a problem and then suggests
that tries to solve or at least ease the problem idenanswer
an
tified. Professor Schauer's creative and provocative proposal for
"an institutional First Amendment" attempts to do both.1 Let
us start with some possible problems with his solution and then
move to some potential problems with his problem.
I
Professor Schauer proposes that we "carve up" the First
Amendment and grant varying degrees of protection to instituVance K. Opperman Research Scholar and Associate Professor, Unit
versity of Minnesota Law School. I thank David McGowan and Frederick
Schauer for their comments.
1. See Frederick Schauer, Towards an InstitutionalFirstAmendment, 89
MINN. L. REV. 1256 (2005).
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tions based upon the degree to which they can generally be expected to serve important First Amendment values. 2 The "institutional press," by which one might mean media businesses
like the New York Times and CBS News (as opposed to other
information providers, like Internet bloggers), would be one
such privileged actor because of its role in exposing government
abuse and providing information critical to a well-functioning
democracy. Another privileged institution would be libraries,
where the public acquires knowledge. A third would be universities. For the libertarian-leaning First Amendment advocate,
what is not to like in giving these obviously important speech
institutions even more protection than they receive now?
Let us initially dispense with one possible complaint about
the proposal. Professor Schauer's proposal requires us to distinguish between "the institutional press and the lone pamphleteer, between the Internet and an adult theater, between
libraries and medical clinics, and between the National Endowment for the Arts [NEA] and the National Institutes of
Health [NIH]," 3 among others. Some might object that line
drawing is itself objectionable. But the fact that a First
Amendment theory calls for line drawing is not a sufficient objection to that theory. Line drawing is both inevitable and desirable in First Amendment doctrine.
There might be a related objection to such line drawing on
the ground that the necessary distinctions among institutions
will be especially hard to make. But the line-drawing problems
created by distinctions like Professor Schauer's do not seem insuperable. While John F. Burns's Pulitzer Prize-winning reporting for the New York Times and Matt Drudge's scandal
mongering for his eponymous Web site might share some characteristics, I have faith that courts could distinguish the two.
For the most part, the possible line-drawing difficulties do not
seem that much more difficult than other line-drawing problems in the First Amendment.
So why has the Court been reluctant to draw distinctions
among types of speakers or institutions? Two of Professor
Schauer's answers do not seem very compelling. He suggests
that judges do not like to draw legal lines on the basis of prelegal categories and that courts are for institutional reasons re-

2. See id. at 1273-77.
3. Id. at 1260.
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4
luctant to make the requisite empirical judgments. There are
very few "prelegal" categories even imaginable today. Certainly
the New York Times and like media outlets have a legal existence confirmed by property, tort, and contract law that is different from the existence of an individual blogger. Though difficult to tame, the Internet too is bounded by law, as of course
are libraries, medical clinics, and government bodies like the
5
NEA and the NIH. Also, as Professor Schauer notes, courts
make difficult empirical judgments all the time, a fate best described by Justice Holmes in, of all things, a famous free speech
opinion: "Every year if not every day we have to wager our sal6
vation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge."
Line drawing is only objectionable when we have reason to
believe that the particular way a proposal calls for it is likely to
raise the very kind of problems the First Amendment should
avoid. This is where Professor Schauer's proposal runs into
some real objections. To see why, it is worth recalling two
dominant themes of First Amendment jurisprudence as well as
the particular dangers that these themes help guard against.
One dominant theme of free speech jurisprudence is agnosticism. A reluctance to make certain kinds of distinctions characterizes First Amendment doctrine. For example, the preference for content neutrality in speech regulation shows a
reluctance to allow the government to favor one message over
another. 7 Thus, the state may not prohibit sexist messages
8
while allowing nonsexist messages. It may not ban advocacy of
slavery while permitting advocacy of abolition. It may not
criminalize Nazi speech while authorizing anti-Nazi speech.
While we as citizens may not be neutral about which sets of
these beliefs are right and valuable, the First Amendment
takes no position on them. It is agnostic about message.
This agnosticism has extended to speaker identity, mostly
on the theory that regulations directed at particular speakers
will tend to reflect hostility to the speaker's probable message.

4. See id. at 1264-69.
5. See id. at 1266-67.
6. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
7. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 691-94 (1991).
8. Cf. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391-96 (invalidating an
ordinance that criminalized fighting words that "communicate messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance").
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The government could not ban speech by Republicans, for example, or by people earning less than $25,000 per year. Even
short of outright prohibition, the state could not grant special
privileges only to certain classes of speakers. For example, the
state cannot give only Democrats prime-time television slots to
communicate their message. The First Amendment is agnostic
about speakers, demanding that they be neither restricted nor
given special privileges based on their identity.
A second dominant theme of First Amendment jurisprudence has been skepticism. The First Amendment is skeptical of
speech regulation in general, and especially of some types of
reasons offered for government suppression of speech. For example, I have argued that the First Amendment is especially
skeptical of paternalistic justifications for speech regulations. 9
The government may also not restrict speech because it fears
people will be persuaded by it to do something harmful.10
These themes of agnosticism and skepticism serve to guard
against three types of problems that raise special First
Amendment concerns. One is government partisanship,favoring one set of views or one ideology over another. A second is
government entrenchment, favoring current political power
holders over challengers. The third is government incompetence,
the danger that the government (including courts) will make
mistakes that harm free speech values."
My concern with Professor Schauer's proposal for institution consciousness is that the necessary line drawing entailed
by his proposal increases the risks of all three problems. That
is, favoring some speakers and institutions over others risks reintroducing the problems of partisanship, entrenchment, and
incompetence. It offers another opportunity for these bites
noires of the First Amendment to reappear. Why is this?
First, the lines between institutions favored and institutions disfavored will be drawn by judges who are being appointed in an increasingly partisan atmosphere. This atmosphere argues for giving them less, not more, opportunity to
favor their own interests. It counsels a set of First Amendment
rules more characterized by blindness to differences than consciousness of differences. While I might trust Professor Schauer
9. Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 584-614 (2004).
10. David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 334, 335-46 (1991).
11. See Carpenter, supranote 9, at 632-33.
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to make the relevant distinctions in a principled fashion and to
apply them in a nonpartisan way, day by day12I grow more skeptical of the federal judiciary's ability to do so.

Second, the institutions favored by courts and even academics will tend to be traditional ones. They will choose institutions that represent dominant modes of analysis and ideas
because such institutions are widely perceived by the decisionmaking class of academics and judges to be most valuable. This
bias might tend to favor mainstream institutions and ideas13 at
the expense of "the poorly financed causes of little people."' Is
it an accident that an institution-conscious First Amendment
favors institutional media, libraries, and universities? These
are the media sources the decision-making class reads, the locations where they research, and the places at which they are
employed. To accept Professor Schauer's proposal, then, we
must be willing to shed some of our skepticism about government justifications for speech regulation.
Every time we "carve up" the First Amendment we run
these risks. We run them when we try to distinguish obscenity
from permissible explicit material, subversive advocacy from
incitement, a public forum from a nonpublic forum, speech from
conduct, and so on. Each of these lines of demarcation is an
opening for the dangers of government partisanship, entrenchment, and incompetence. We run the risks, however, because they are thought to be worth it in a given context. Agnosticism and skepticism counsel against introducing yet another
chance for more such carving up to erode the pluralistic values
of the First Amendment, at least unless we have a very good
reason to do so. Do we?
II
Professor Schauer offers several concrete problems and one
overarching problem that an institution-conscious First
Amendment might address. 14 None of these problems seems
compelling enough at this stage to run the risks created by a
newly institution-conscious First Amendment.
Let us look at a couple of concrete problems that Professor
Schauer argues are created by institution blindness. One problem he identifies is that current doctrine protects fewer rights
12. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
13. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943).
14. See Schauer, supra note 1, at 1270-73.
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for the institutional press "than exist in many countries with a
far more constricted view of freedom of speech and freedom of
the press in general. .. 15 These include rights of access to information and rights to shield confidentially obtained information. 16 These potential access and confidentiality rights go unprotected largely because of the difficulty the Court thinks it
would have in distinguishing real reporters from insignificant
freelancers and imposters. "A Supreme Court unwilling to distinguish among the lone pamphleteer, the blogger, and the fulltime reporter for the New York Times is far less likely to grant
special privileges to pamphleteers and bloggers than. . . to
grant privileges to no one," argues Professor Schauer, so it has
opted to grant informational and confidentiality privileges to no
one. 17 That seems right, but so what? There is little evidence
that the institutional press in the United States has less access
to confidential government information than does the press in
countries with more formal rights to such information.
Consider the effect of having no constitutional protection of
confidentiality for the institutional press. Despite the absence
of constitutional protections shielding their identities, confidential sources inside the government still speak to reporters, revealing important information to the public. Part of the reason
for this is that prosecutions for revealing confidential information are so rare. Another reason is that many states have enacted their own shield laws giving reporters' sources some pro18
tection.
Now consider the effect of having no constitutional right
guaranteeing the institutional press access to government records. Has this seriously limited the public's knowledge of government activity? It is hard to know for sure, in part because
government records in this country and many others are already largely open by statutory requirement. More than fifty
developed countries-including the United States and its constituent states-have freedom of information laws. 19 Official
secrecy has been seriously eroded, though not eliminated, by
such laws. It is hard to know what a constitutional mandate

15.
16.
17.
18.
to THE

Id. at 1270-71.
Id.
Id. at 1272.
See REPORTERS COMMITrEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, Introduction
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE COMPENDIUM (2002), available at http://www.

rcfp.org/cgi-local/privilege/item.cgi?i-i-tro.
19.

Out of the Darkness, ECONOMIST, Jan. 1, 2005, at 41.
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could helpfully do beyond the access already guaranteed. Moreover, even though these laws apply equally to everybody (including the sweaty-palmed blogger), the institutional press is
best situated to take advantage of them. This is because the institutional press has access to more resources, has superior incentive and interest, and has greater expertise. Thus, even
without a constitutional privilege for the institutional press, it
already has greater access to hidden government information
as a practical matter.
A second practical problem Professor Schauer cites is that
current doctrine obliges us "to treat mass distribution of detailed instructions for causing harm in the same way that we
treat an individual speaking to a live audience. ."20 It is not
clear that this is much of a problem. Individual counseling to
harm may be even more harmful than mass communications of
the same instructions because individual counseling is more focused. Even if it is a problem, it does not seem like a problem
properly addressed by an institution-conscious First Amendment. Instead, it might be a problem for the boundaries of First
Amendment coverage as a whole. It is not immediately clear
why instructions for mass killing should enjoy any free speech
protection, regardless of whether those instructions are conveyed to a larger audience or to a single person.
The larger problem Professor Schauer addresses is dilution. 21 Think of water as a metaphor. The idea is that the
broader the coverage offered by the First Amendment, the more
shallow that coverage will tend to be. Like a finite quantity of
water, the First Amendment may be diluted if it is spread over
too large an area. This argument is sometimes offered against
22
giving protection to commercial speech, for example. A court
willing to give commercial advertising constitutional protection
likely would not give it full protection; instead, the dilution
theory maintains, the lesser protection given to commercial
speech might then be given to core political speech.
The dilution problem seems right in theory. The trouble is
that there is very little evidence for it in practice. The experience of the past eighty-five years of serious First Amendment
scrutiny of speech regulation suggests the opposite of what a
dilution theory would predict. That is, the trajectory of the
20. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1271 (citation omitted).
21. See id. at 1271-72.
22. See id.
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First Amendment has been both to expand the scope of coverage and to deepen it, not to weaken coverage as it has steadily
expanded. Even as the Court deepened the First Amendment's
protection for subversive advocacy, 23 it expanded its coverage in
areas formerly thought completely unprotected by tightening
the definition of things like libel 24 and obscenity. 25 Similarly,
Justice Powell's fears that protection of commercial speech
would weaken protection for political speech 26 have so far
proved unfounded. Indeed, the current Court, presiding over
the most robust First Amendment in American history, is the
most libertarian we have ever had on speech issues. And two of
its most libertarian members when it comes to protecting
speech have otherwise been its most conservative and progovernment members. 27 Thus, our free speech sea is deeper and
broader then it has ever been. Dilution is a theory trapped by a
metaphor.
III
The institution-conscious First Amendment does preserve
a form of blindness. In granting some institutions greater constitutional protection than others, it is blind to whether the
preferred institution is actually serving important free speech
interests in a given case. That is, for example, reporters for the
institutional press would enjoy some form of privilege to shield
confidential sources, even where a particular exercise of the
privilege did not serve First Amendment values. 28 There would
be manifold difficulties in trying to decide which instances of
shielding served First Amendment values and which did not.
The dangers of partisanship, entrenchment, and incompetence
would always lurk. So the institution-conscious First Amend23. Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (affirming conviction under "clear and present danger" standard), with Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969) (reversing conviction under a stricter
standard).
24. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-82 (1964).
25. CompareRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487-92 (1957) (defining
"obscenity"), with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (narrowing the
definition of "obscenity").
26. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).
27. For example, Justice Scalia joined the Court's decision to strike a ban
on flag burning, Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398, 420 (1989), and Justice
Thomas supported the invalidation of a federal restriction on child pornography, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 259-60 (2002).
28. Schauer, supra note 1, at 1275.
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ment does not attempt to draw lines around valuable speech
with any precision. Certain institutions will be trusted with
greater protection because protecting them is a rough proxy for
protecting free speech values. That modesty about judicial capabilities and that evidence of both skepticism and agnosticism
seem sensible. Carving up the First Amendment in everthinner slices to serve its larger purposes, after all, might undermine them.

